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Formation of contract 
Certainty and completeness 
10.1 The issue of contract formation arose in the unusual context of civil 
procedure in Wellmix Organics (International) Pte Ltd v Lau Yu Man [2006] 
2 SLR 117 (see also para 10.60 on “Mistake”). The plaintiff in this case 
unsuccessfully sought to enforce a consent unless order against the 
defendant. Andrew Phang Boon Leong J (as he then was) emphasised that, 
keeping in view its very drastic consequence of depriving a party of his cause 
of action, such an order will only be established where the terms of the 
agreement are clear and unambiguous. It was clear on the facts that the 
parties had not adequately expressed any intention to enter into such an 
agreement, and even if there was a possibility of an agreement, such 
agreement must fail because the parties were not in fact ad idem. 
Significantly, Phang J also laid stress on the critical importance of assessing 
the evidence objectively in ascertaining the parties’ intention. 
10.2 Although certainty and contractual intention are clearly distinct 
elements of contract formation, arguments in relation to both these elements 
are often raised in conjunction and do frequently overlap. This was observed 
by Andrew Ang J in Chua Kim Leng (Cai Jinling) v Phillip Securities Pte Ltd 
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[2006] SGHC 221, who found on the facts of that case that an oral agreement 
for the payment of commissions existed between the plaintiff and defendant. 
This conclusion is unsurprising given that the plaintiff had in fact fulfilled 
her promise under the agreement and the defendant had by its conduct 
accepted its obligation to remunerate the plaintiff for her services. The fact 
that the agreement did not spell out detailed provisions as to the host of 
contingencies that could have arisen did not render the agreement too vague 
and uncertain to enforce, nor was it realistic to insist that the requisite 
contractual intention was lacking in the face of such evidence. 
10.3 In CS Bored Pile System Pte Ltd v Evan Lim & Co Pte Ltd [2006] 
2 SLR 1, Choo Han Teck J was also satisfied that an oral agreement had been 
formed between the plaintiff subcontractor and the defendant main 
contractor. Choo J observed (at [6]) that “it is not unusual that in 
construction contracts some terms and conditions might have to be worked 
out subsequently to the formation of the contract, but as long as the nature 
and general structure of the agreement is clear, that agreement is enforceable 
in law”.  
10.4 The foregoing cases may be contrasted with GYC Financial Planning 
v Prudential Assurance Company Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2006] 2 SLR 865, where 
an alleged oral contract failed on both the grounds of uncertainty and lack of 
intention to create a binding contract. Here, the alleged agreement was for 
the provision of marketing of financial products over an extended period of 
time. As such activities are closely regulated by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, the absence of detailed provisions tailored to ensure strict 
compliance with the legal and regulatory restrictions militated against the 
finding of a binding agreement. See also Otech Pakistan Pvt Ltd v Clough 
Engineering Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 1, where an allegation that the parties’ 
negotiations amounted to an oral variation of an antecedent contract failed.  
Consideration  
10.5 In Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 1 
SLR 853, Andrew Phang Boon Leong J (as he then was) questioned (albeit in 
an obiter capacity) whether the doctrine of consideration still served any 
useful role in validating contracts. Citing the earlier and similar observations 
by V K Rajah JC (as he then was) in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte 
Ltd [2004] 2 SLR 594 at [139], Phang J observed (at [29]) that although the 
case for dispensing with the requirement for consideration is strongest in 
purely commercial transactions, the same may be true even of non-
commercial transactions principally because the usefulness of the doctrine 
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has been substantially blunted by the controversial English Court of Appeal 
decision in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1. 
As Phang J explained at [30]: 
…the combined effect of Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd 
(to the effect that a factual, as opposed to a legal, benefit or detriment is 
sufficient consideration) and the well-established proposition that 
consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate (see, for example, 
the Singapore Court of Appeal decision of Wong Fook Heng v Amixco Asia 
Pte Ltd [1992] 2 SLR 342 at 348, [23]) is that (as Rajah JC has pointed out 
in Digilandmall (see [28] above)) it will, absent exceptional circumstances, 
be all too easy to locate some element of consideration between contracting 
parties. This would render the requirement of consideration otiose or 
redundant, at least for the most part. On the other hand, there are other 
possible alternatives available that can perform the tasks that the doctrine 
of consideration is intended to effect. These include the requirement of 
writing, as well as the doctrines of promissory estoppel, economic duress 
and undue influence (for these two last-mentioned doctrines, in the context 
of the modification of existing legal obligations). 
10.6 It is true indeed that commercial transactions are rarely defeated for 
lack of consideration. Thus, an attempt to invalidate an assignment of debt 
on the ground of lack of consideration failed in Leun Wah Electric Co (Pte) 
Ltd v Sigma Cable Co (Pte) Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 227. In this case, the plaintiff 
raised the somewhat surprising argument that as the assignment was made 
only as a partial payment for debts owed by the plaintiff to the defendant, it 
was insufficient consideration. Rejecting this argument, Choo Han Teck J 
found that the assignment, which was made in lieu of cash payment, was 
clearly good consideration for the defendant’s agreement to discharge part of 
the debts owed to it by the plaintiff. Similarly, the argument that a 
compromise agreement was unsupported by consideration and hence 
unenforceable also failed in Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad bin Talib v A Formation 
Construction Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 778. Judith Prakash J found that the 
defendant in this case had furnished consideration when, pursuant to the 
compromise agreement, it gave up its rights to dispute the plaintiff ’s claims. 
It was immaterial that the defendant’s claim might have been weak, as long as 
the defendant believed in good faith that it had reasonable grounds for 
making the claim. 
Estoppel 
10.7 It was held in Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad bin Talib v A Formation 
Construction Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 778 (“Abdul Jalil”) (see also para 10.6 on 
“Consideration” above and para 10.40 on “Capacity” below) that the plaintiff 
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lessor was estopped from going back on its promise to waive the payment of 
certain rental arrears as the defendant had, in reliance on the promise, paid 
other moneys due in accordance with the plaintiff ’s requirements, and 
incurred further expense in completing the redevelopment works on the 
subject property. Significantly, Judith Prakash J adopted (at [44]), citing 
Chitty on Contracts (H G Beale gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 29th Ed, 2004) at 
para 3-135), the English position that “detriment of any kind … is not an 
essential requirement [of promissory estoppel] and all that is necessary is 
that the promisee should have acted in reliance on the promise in such a way 
as to make it inequitable to allow the promisor to act inconsistently with it”. 
These observations are of undoubted significance, particularly in view of the 
more equivocal position taken by the Singapore High Court in Fu Loong 
Lithographer Pte Ltd v Mun Hean Realty Pte Ltd [1989] SLR 300. In that case, 
Grimberg JC appeared, on the one hand, to have endorsed the requirement 
for detriment as a necessary element of the doctrine but adopted (at p 309), 
on the other hand, a broad definition of “detriment” as “the injustice to the 
promisee which would result if the promisor were allowed to recede from the 
promise” (citing Spencer Bower and Turner on Estoppel by Representation 
(3rd Ed)). Taken literally, this has the effect of equating “detriment” with 
“inequity” (another essential element of the doctrine), and does not confine 
the concept to the demonstration of some prejudice or disadvantage suffered 
in reliance on the promisor’s representation. Notwithstanding this broad 
approach, however, Grimberg JC then proceeded to refer specifically to the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant to explain why the requirement for 
“detriment” had been satisfied. Thus, the decision in Fu Loong Lithographer 
Pte Ltd v Mun Hean Realty Pte Ltd is, at best, ambiguous on this issue of 
detriment.  
10.8 In contrast, Prakash J in Abdul Jalil appears to have unequivocally 
excluded the requirement for prejudice as an essential element of the 
doctrine. That said, however, it should be noted that the element of prejudice 
was also established in Abdul Jalil, as the promisee in that case had incurred 
expense in reliance on the relevant representation. 
10.9 The doctrine of estoppel by convention was applied by the High 
Court in Candid Water Cooler Pte Ltd v United Overseas Bank Ltd [2006] 
3 SLR 216 with the result that contracting parties who had acted on the 
assumption that the condition precedent to the completion of the sale and 
purchase of a property had been fulfilled were bound by the completion date 
so determined even if it subsequently transpired that both parties were in 
fact unable, through no fault of either party, to complete the transaction on 
the date contemplated. See also Spandeck Engineering Pte Ltd v Defence 
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Science & Technology Agency [2007] 1 SLR 720, where the doctrine was 
similarly applied. For a decision in which an attempt to plead estoppel by 
convention failed, see Chew Tong Seng v Chew Cheng Quee [2006] SGHC 149.  
The terms of the contract 
Construction of terms 
10.10 The objective approach to the construction of contractual 
documents was applied by the High Court in Parkway Hospitals Singapore Pte 
Ltd v Sandar Aung [2007] 1 SLR 227. The agreement in question was signed 
by the defendant and obliged her to be liable for “all charges, expenses and 
liabilities incurred by and on behalf” of her mother who had received 
treatment at the plaintiff ’s hospital. At the time the agreement was signed, 
the hospital had given the defendant an estimate of the hospital charges, 
which was approximately $15,000. The final bill rendered, however, exceeded 
$500,000. The defendant argued that on a proper construction of the 
agreement, the plaintiff could only recover an amount in the region of the 
estimate given. Judith Prakash J held that the words “all charges, expenses 
and liabilities” had to be given their plain meaning and could not be limited 
to the estimated charges. Although the agreement was drafted by the plaintiff, 
the contra proferentem rule did not apply as there was no ambiguity in the 
agreement. 
10.11 The importance of a contextual approach to the construction of 
contracts was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Clarke Quay Pte Ltd v Tan 
Hun Ling [2006] 3 SLR 626. In order to determine the nature of the 
contractual obligations undertaken by the respective parties to a contract, an 
objective consideration of the language, spirit and concomitant purpose of 
the relevant terms of the contract had to be undertaken. In this regard, the 
purely subjective perceptions of a party to the contract were not relevant. 
10.12 A similar construction exercise was conducted in Panwah Steel Pte 
Ltd v Koh Brothers Building & Civil Engineering Contractor (Pte) Ltd [2006] 
4 SLR 571. The Court of Appeal however adopted slightly different 
terminology, referring instead to a purposive construction of the contract, 
which required a consideration of the express and material terms of the 
contract, read in an integrated fashion in the context in which the contract 
was made. 
10.13 The contract was for the supply of steel bars by P to KB, who were 
the main contractors for a water reclamation project in Changi. As a result of 
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its own supplier’s cessation of the delivery of steel bars, P failed to supply the 
full contracted amount to KB. Although KB did not require the remaining 
quantity of bars for the Changi project, it nevertheless wanted P to deliver 
the balance as it wanted to replenish its own stocks. The issue before the 
court was whether the contract between the parties was “project-specific”, 
such that the obligation to supply steel bars was dependant on the actual 
requirements of the project.  
10.14 Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA held that on a purposive 
interpretation of all the relevant terms of the contract, the contract was 
clearly “project-specific”. As such, P was not liable to KB for not supplying 
the balance number of steel bars.  
10.15 The construction of an express warranty in a marine insurance 
policy was considered in Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (Singapore) Ltd v 
Metico Marine Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 333. In this regard, Judith Prakash J 
stated as follows (at [39]): 
As an express warranty in an insurance policy is a clause that must be 
complied with strictly by the insured in order that cover is maintained, it is, 
as well, a clause that has to be read equally strictly when its meaning is in 
issue. The insured should be able to take the words of the warranty at their 
face value and comply with the literal meaning of the warranty (unless of 
course this would lead to absurdity) without being at risk of finding that 
the insurance cover has been lifted by reason of breach of the warranty. 
10.16 In The Asia Star [2006] 3 SLR 612, the agreement in question was a 
standard form charterparty which modified the shipowner’s absolute 
obligation at common law to provide a sea- and cargo-worthy vessel. The 
modified obligation merely required the shipowner to exercise due diligence 
to make the vessel both sea- and cargo-worthy. A clause in the charterparty 
also gave the owner the right to cancel the charterparty without liability in 
the event the cargo holds were not fit to carry cargo. In response to the 
argument that, because of this particular clause, the vessel owner would not 
be liable even if the vessel was not cargo-worthy, Tan Lee Meng J held that 
such a construction would render the obligation to exercise due diligence 
without “room to operate” (at [46]). His Honour held that the charterparty 
had to be construed in a manner that would give effect to the intention of the 
parties. The necessary assumption must be that the parties did not intend to 
include meaningless terms in the contract. Further, the common law 
obligation was an important one, and any attempt to whittle it down 
contractually had therefore to be strictly construed (at [47]). 
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10.17 For an application of the general principles of contractual 
construction in an unusual fact situation, see Lal Hiranand v Kamla Lal 
Hiranand [2007] 2 SLR 165 (see also para 10.64 on “Undue influence”.) 
The parol evidence rule 
10.18 In Jet Holding Ltd v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 
3 SLR 769, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA observed in passing that the parol 
evidence rule must be distinguished from ss 63–67 of the Evidence Act 
(Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) as the provisions served rather different purposes. 
While the parol evidence rule applied to restrict the liberty of the parties to 
have resort to evidence extraneous to the document, the core rationale for 
ss 63–67 was to ensure that the best evidence was before the court. Any 
overlap in the form of evidence that could fall within ss 93 and 94 would 
therefore be purely a factual coincidence.  
10.19 The parol evidence rule was also applied in Orient Centre 
Investments Ltd v Societe Generale [2006] SGHC 164.  
Implied terms 
10.20 In the case of Forefront Medical Technology (Pte) Ltd v Modern-Pak 
Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR 927 (“Forefront Medical Technology”), the plaintiff 
entered into a contract with the defendant, for the defendant to supply 
clamshells into which the plaintiff ’s medical devices for surgical procedures 
were packed for supply to its customers. These clamshells were produced 
from material supplied by May Polyester Films Sdn Bhd (“May”). It 
transpired, however, that a significant number of the clamshells produced by 
the defendant were cracked, leading the plaintiff ’s customer to reject the 
equipment packed in the clamshells. The cracks arose because the raw 
material supplied by May was defective. The plaintiff thus brought an action 
against the defendant for loss and damages. 
10.21 The case turned on two threshold questions: first, whether it was a 
term in the contract that the defendant procure the material for the 
production of the clamshells from May and no other source; and if so, 
whether it was an express or implied term of the contract that the defendant 
would have discharged its contractual obligations as to the suitability of the 
material for the production of clamshells by providing the relevant 
Certificates of Analysis (“COAs”) from May. On the evidence before him, 
Andrew Phang Boon Leong J (as he then was) found in favour of the 
defendant as, in the learned judge’s view, express terms had been stipulated as 
to both issues: see [62]–[63], and [69]–[75].  
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10.22 But it is the learned judge’s analysis as to the inter-relationship 
between the business efficacy and the officious bystander tests of implied 
terms that is of greatest general interest. At [36] of the grounds of decision, 
the learned judge observed: 
An even cursory perusal of the above statement of principle by Scrutton LJ 
[in Reigate v Union Manufacturing Company (Ramsbottom), Limited and 
Elton Copdyeing Company, Limited [1918] 1 KB 592, at 605] will reveal the 
integration as well as complementarity of the “business efficacy” and 
“officious bystander” tests. This is especially evident by the learned judge’s 
use of the linking phrase “that is” in the above quotation. Indeed, the plain 
and natural meaning of this quotation is too clear to admit of any other 
reasonable construction or interpretation. And it is this: that the “officious 
bystander” test is the practical mode by which the “business efficacy” test is 
implemented. [emphasis in original] 
10.23 Emphasising the point, at [40], the learned judge reiterated:  
Given the persuasive historical and judicial background as well as the 
general logic concerned, I would suggest that the approach from 
complementarity ought to prevail.  
This followed several careful paragraphs of analysis, setting out various other 
judicial positions that had been taken, for example, where the two tests were 
treated as being interchangeable equivalents, or as alternative and wholly 
different tests (at [34] and [39]). Following the lead taken by Judith Prakash J 
in the case of Telestop Pte Ltd v Telecom Equipment Pte Ltd [2004] SGHC 267 
(“Telestop Pte Ltd”) (who, in turn, had cited with approval Phang J’s earlier 
academic work, “Implied Terms, Business Efficacy and the Officious 
Bystander – A Modern History” [1998] JBL 1), Phang J’s analysis of 
“complementarity” is, seemingly, not to be taken to be the same as either of 
these approaches.  
10.24 In the two grounds of decision handed down separately by Phang 
and Prakash JJ, reference was made to Scrutton LJ’s analysis in Reigate v 
Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) [1918] 1 KB 592, at 605, that: 
A term can only be implied if it is necessary in the business sense to give 
efficacy to the contract; that is, if it is such a term that it can confidently be 
said that if at the time the contract was being negotiated some one had said 
to the parties, “What shall happen in such case,” they would both have 
replied, “Of course, so and so will happen; we did not trouble to say that; it 
is too clear.” Unless the Court comes to some such conclusion as that, it 
ought not to imply a term which the parties themselves have not expressed. 
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10.25 Relying on this, both Prakash and Phang JJ concluded that the 
“officious bystander” test is the practical mode by which the theoretical 
guideline encompassed within the “business efficacy” test is satisfied, to 
paraphrase the wording used by the two learned judges in Telestop Pte Ltd at 
[68] and Forefront Medical Technology at [36], respectively.  
10.26 However, it may be helpful to bear in mind Bowen LJ’s observations 
in The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 at 68: 
Now, an implied warranty, or, as it is called, a covenant in law, as 
distinguished from an express contract or express warranty, really is in all 
cases founded on the presumed intention of the parties, and upon reason. … 
I believe if one were to take all the cases, and there are many, of implied 
warranties or covenants in law, it will be found that in all of them the law is 
raising an implication from the presumed intention of the parties with the 
object of giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must have 
intended that at all events it should have. [emphasis added] 
10.27 Interestingly, this seemingly inverts the proposition put forward by 
Prakash and Phang JJ. As Prof Treitel put it, “‘business efficacy’ … is merely a 
practical test for determining the intention of the parties: in most cases, it 
can be assumed that they would have agreed to a term which is necessary to 
make their agreement work”. (G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (Thomson 
Sweet & Maxwell, 11th Ed, 2003) at pp 202–203). It therefore seems that the 
true relationship between the two tests for implied terms may still be ripe for 
further examination by the courts.  
10.28 The second aspect for which Forefront Medical Technology may claim 
significance lies in its analysis of terms implied in law (at [42]–[45]). But as 
that discussion was clearly obiter dicta, those observations are better 
discussed together with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Jet Holding Ltd 
v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 769 (“Jet Holding Ltd”) 
where the issue of terms implied in law formed part of its ratio decidendi.  
10.29 The dispute in Jet Holding Ltd arose from the fracture of a slip joint 
on board an oil-rig owned by the first plaintiff, Jet Holding Limited (“JHL”) 
and chartered to the second plaintiff, Jet Shipping Ltd (“JSL”) on a bareboat 
charter, leading to the loss of the oil-rig’s drilling unit. Prior to the loss, the 
oil-rig was equipped with two slip joints. Both were found by the manager of 
the oil-rig to be unfit for use. Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
(“Cameron”), the first defendant, was engaged to refurbish both slip joints, 
the other party to this contract being the then-owner of the oil-rig, JSL. 
Cameron sub-contracted the work to Van Der Horst Engineering Services 
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Pte Ltd (“VDH”) and the second defendant, Stork Technology Services Asia 
Pte Ltd (“Stork”). Using selected parts from both joints, VDH re-assembled a 
single operational joint. The discarded unused parts were sent to Stork for 
fabrication into a second “Standby Slip Joint.” At trial, it was established that 
it was this “Standby Slip Joint” which failed due to over-machining of the 
walls of a load-bearing component in the slip-joint, leading to its inability to 
support the weight of the drilling unit which had been attached to it. Both 
Cameron and Stork were found to be in breach of their tortious duties of 
care to the plaintiffs.  
10.30 But the issue of greatest significance for the Court of Appeal was the 
issue of liability between Cameron and Stork. It transpired that Stork had 
over-machined the walls of the slip-joint because it had failed to conduct a 
dimensional inspection of the slip-joint as it was expressly obliged to do. The 
question then arose as to whether Cameron’s failure to supply Stork with 
dimensional drawings of the slip joint might amount to a breach of its 
obligations to take reasonable care in the performance of the contract.  
10.31 In this connection, the Court of Appeal recognised that there was no 
such express term in the contract between Cameron and Stork; nor had it 
been pleaded that such a term might have been implied in fact: at [89] 
(although it is plain that there is nothing, in principle, to prevent implication 
of such kinds of terms in fact; an example of this may be found in the 
District Court case of Media Corp of Singapore Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior 
Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2006] SGDC 132 at [45]). But Cameron’s 
failure to supply these dimensional drawings could (and did) amount to a 
breach of a term implied in law to take reasonable care. 
10.32 Citing the relevant passages of Forefront Medical Technology at [42]–
[44] with approval, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA recognised that although 
the category of implied terms at law would tend to generate uncertainty 
because of the breadth of the criteria to imply such terms being grounded on 
reasons of public policy, the reality of such a category of terms could not be 
denied: at [90]–[91]. That said, “general reasons of justice and fairness as well 
as of public policy justify the implication of a “term implied in law” in cases 
such as the present to the effect that each party (here, Cameron and Stork) 
would owe each other a duty to take reasonable care in the performance of 
the respective parts of the contract they had entered into”: at [92]. Further, 
given the nature of this category of implied term, it did not matter that this 
issue had never been pleaded since such terms are, “recognised by the court 
as a matter of law” [emphasis in original]: at [93]. In consequence, both 
Cameron and Stork were in breach of certain of their obligations to each 
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other under the refurbishment contract. The implications of this are 
explored further below (see para 10.80 below on “Remedies”).  
10.33 Notwithstanding the expansive developments discussed above, it 
should be kept in mind that the ability of the courts to imply terms is capable 
of being checked or modified by statute. Thus, as was observed in the case of 
Marina Offshore Pte Ltd v China Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 
4 SLR 689, the normal contractual tests for implication of terms in fact do 
not apply to a contract of marine insurance because ss 33 to 41 of the Marine 
Insurance Act (Cap 387, 1994 Rev Ed) provide that, “implied promissory 
warranties are only those warranties implied by law through the various 
sections of the Act that impose them”: at [25]. 
Exception clauses 
10.34 The nature and function of exception and limitation clauses were 
considered in the High Court decision of Emjay Enterprises Pte Ltd v Skylift 
Consolidator (Pte) Ltd [2006] 2 SLR 268. The issue before the court was 
whether a contracting party could argue that an exception clause could 
nevertheless be introduced at the assessment of damages stage despite it not 
having been pleaded. The premise for the point was that an exception clause 
related not to liability but to quantum of damages, and was thus not required 
to be pleaded pursuant to O 18 r 13(4) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, 
2004 Rev Ed). The exception clause in question was in fact a limitation of 
liability clause. But Andrew Phang Boon Leong J (as he then was) observed 
that the primary nature of an exception clause, whether it sought to exclude 
liability altogether or whether it sought to limit liability, was to govern the 
obligations of the respective parties to the contract. As such, exception 
clauses deal with the issue of liability, even though this would necessarily 
have an impact on the question of quantum: at [19]–[21]. A fortiori, such 
defences ought to have been pleaded: at [31]. His Honour also contrasted 
exception clauses with liquidated damages clauses, observing that, as the 
latter clauses constitute an attempt at fixing the quantum of loss, they lie 
more appropriately in the sphere of assessment of damages: at [28]–[29]. 
10.35 Phang J also usefully reviewed the existing law on the construction 
of exception clauses, in particular, whether the doctrine of fundamental 
breach was a rule of construction or a rule of law. Referring to Lord Diplock’s 
judgment in the House of Lords decision in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor 
Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, Phang J observed (at [14]): 
[A] fundamental breach of contract does not necessarily and automatically 
destroy the efficacy of an exception clause because, whilst the primary 
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obligations come to an end, the secondary obligation (to pay damages) 
remains and an exception clause might cover this last-mentioned liability. 
Whether or not the exception clause in question does in fact cover such 
liability is not an automatic rule of law as such but, rather, a matter of 
construction of the contract. In other words, the court’s task is to construe the 
exception clause concerned in the context of the contract as a whole in 
order to ascertain whether the contracting parties intended that the 
exception clause cover the events that have actually happened. If they did, 
then the exception clause would be given effect to by the court, 
notwithstanding the fact that a fundamental breach has occurred. This is 
because, to re-emphasise a crucial point, the intention of the parties is the 
touchstone. [emphasis in original] 
10.36 His Honour, sitting in the Court of Appeal, reiterated this position 
in Sun Technosystems Pte Ltd v Federal Express Services (M) Sdn Bhd [2007] 
1 SLR 411. Noting that the Privy Council decision in Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd v 
Rambler Cycle Co Ltd [1959] AC 576 provided authority for the contrary 
proposition (ie that the doctrine was a rule of law), Phang JA stated (at [20]): 
Sze Hai Tong Bank was decided during a time when the law had not settled 
in its more modern and established form as embodied in Photo 
Production ... More importantly, the doctrine of fundamental breach as a 
“rule of construction” embodied in Photo Production is both principled and 
logical, …and we take the opportunity to affirm its application in the 
Singapore context…As this court is presently the final appellate court, the 
Privy Council decision in Sze Hai Tong Bank is not binding on it. It may be 
regarded, at best, a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction and, if 
necessary, may be departed from by this court … 
It is thus settled that the fundamental breach doctrine, as it applies in 
Singapore, is a rule of construction. 
Conclusive evidence clauses 
10.37 In Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] 4 SLR 
273, the Court of Appeal considered and affirmed the efficacy of a conclusive 
evidence clause in the following terms: 
The Customer hereby agrees … to examine all statements of account, bank 
statements, printed forms, deposit slips, credit advice notes, transaction 
advices and other documents (hereinafter in this Clause referred to 
collectively as “statements”) supplied by the Bank setting out transactions 
on any of the Accounts and agrees that unless the Customer objects in 
writing to any of the matters contained in such statement within 14 days of 
the date of such statement, the Customer shall be deemed conclusively to 
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have accepted all the matters contained in such statement as true and 
accurate in all respects. 
The company had a deposit account with the bank, and had conferred on the 
bank the right to set off moneys in the account against the company’s 
indebtedness to the bank. The defendant bank, acting on certain forged 
instruments, subsequently set off the money in the account against a 
drawdown by the company of a credit facility that had been established in the 
company’s favour. The company claimed the return of the money it had 
deposited.  
10.38 The Court of Appeal held that, although a bank had no mandate at 
common law to make payment on a forged instrument, and would hence be 
liable to its customer if it did so, the bank’s conclusive evidence clause in the 
present case was worded sufficiently widely and clearly to exonerate the bank 
from the consequences of having paid out money illegitimately. V K Rajah J 
(as he then was) stated (at [60]) as follows: 
[I]n principle conclusive evidence clauses employed in a banker and 
corporate customer relationship afford a practical and reasonable device for 
pragmatic management of risk allocation. There is nothing intrinsically 
objectionable about such clauses provided they are properly and reasonably 
defined. 
10.39 Rajah J took care (at [61]) to restrict the court’s conclusion to cases 
where the customers were commercial entities: 
In the context of banks on the one hand (which would otherwise bear the 
onerous, if not near impossible task of detecting forgeries given the advent 
of modern technology) and commercial entities on the other (which only 
have to check their own records), we do not find it onerous or unreasonable 
to place the risk of loss on the latter if this has already been agreed upon. 
However, we are not required to express a general opinion as to the 
reasonableness of conclusive evidence clauses as and when applied to 
individuals and non-corporate customers since the issue does not arise in 
the present context. Each case will entail a careful examination of its own 
peculiar factual matrix starting with a careful scrutiny of the conclusive 
evidence clause that is being questioned. 
Capacity 
10.40 Another interesting question which arose in Abdul Jalil bin Ahmad 
bin Talib v A Formation Construction Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 778 (see also 
paras 10.6 and 10.7 on “Formation”) was whether the plaintiff ’s solicitors 
had the ostensible authority to settle the plaintiff ’s claim against the 
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defendant. Applying Waugh v HB Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] Ch 374, Judith 
Prakash J was satisfied that the plaintiff ’s solicitors were indeed clothed with 
the relevant authority. Further, and more significantly, Prakash J also held 
that such ostensible authority could only be defeated by actual knowledge of 
the agent’s lack of authority. Constructive or imputed knowledge would not 
suffice. The learned judge reasoned (at [34]) as follows: 
In my view, constructive knowledge cannot be sufficient for this purpose as 
when you are dealing with an apparent position the only way of nullifying 
such appearance would, logically, be actual knowledge that what appears to 
be the case is, in fact, not the case. 
10.41 It is respectfully submitted, however, that this thorny issue may not 
always admit such a clear-cut solution. First, as the experience in other 
contexts (such as that involving unilateral mistakes, see para 10.61below) has 
shown, the distinction between actual and constructive knowledge is often an 
elusive one given that the fact of knowledge is determined objectively by 
drawing inferences from the circumstances. Secondly, if regard be had to the 
fact that ostensible authority is itself an objective notion, ie the authority 
which the agent reasonably appeared to have to the third party, the alleged 
illogic of denying authority on the basis that the third party ought to have 
known of the agent’s lack of authority would seem much less evident.  
Discharge of the contract 
Discharge by agreement 
10.42 In GYC Financial Planning v Prudential Assurance Company 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2006] 2 SLR 865 (see also para 10.4), Judith Prakash J 
clarified that although a termination clause had to be precisely observed by 
the terminating party, it did not follow that such a clause would be breached 
by giving a longer notice than that specified in the agreement. Nor is a 
termination notice defective only because it does not specify the duration of 
the notice period, as it suffices if the notified party was in fact given the 
contractually specified period of notice. Further, where an agreement is 
terminated in accordance with a provision which permits termination by 
notice, the terminating party’s right to end the agreement is absolute and he 
is not obliged to furnish any reason for his decision. 
Discharge by repudiatory breach 
10.43 It is trite law that a contract may be discharged on the acceptance by 
one party of a repudiation of the contract by the other. It is also trite law that 
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such discharge has only prospective effect: it only releases the contracting 
parties from as-yet unperformed obligations under the contract. The 
discharge has no effect as to obligations arising prior to the discharge. But the 
application of these trite principles in the District Court case of Ng Kim 
Siong t/a Regency Asia Building Services v Management Corporation Strata 
Title Plan No 1634 [2006] SGDC 121 illustrates the need to take care in the 
usage of the language of “repudiatory breach”. 
10.44 The plaintiff contracted with the defendant management 
corporation to provide cleaning services for the condominium managed by 
the defendant for the period of two years ending on 15 March 2004. The 
defendant expressly agreed that so long as the plaintiff complied with the 
terms, covenants, conditions and stipulations of the agreement throughout 
the period of the contract, the plaintiff could opt for an extension of the 
contract for a further two years on the same terms and at the same rate of 
payment by giving written notice of such intention at least three months 
prior to the expiry of the agreement (at [3]). Accordingly, on 28 November 
2003, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant to make known his intention to 
exercise the option to extend the contract for a further two years. This met 
with no response from the defendant until February 2004. In the interim 
period, the defendant discovered that equivalent cleaning services could be 
procured from other service providers at a lower cost. It decided to award the 
cleaning contract to another company when the agreement with the plaintiff 
came to an end to reduce expenditures. This decision was communicated to 
the plaintiff on 19 February 2004 by letter, requesting also that the plaintiff 
hand over the keys to the condominium necessary for the carrying out of 
cleaning operations by 27 February 2004. The plaintiff responded by letter on 
23 February 2004, stating that the premature demand for return of the keys 
amounted to a wrongful repudiation of the contract as well as its right to 
renew it. In a further letter, the defendant acknowledged that the date for 
handing over the keys ought to be postponed to 16 March 2004, but alleged 
that the plaintiff had provided unsatisfactory services with the result that the 
option for extension of the contract could not be made. 
10.45 The learned District Judge Thian Yee Sze found that the raison d’etre 
for the defendant’s refusal to renew the agreement with the plaintiff was its 
desire to cut costs (at [15]), that the plaintiff had fulfilled all the pre-
conditions for exercise of the option to extend the contract and had the right 
to exercise it (at [30]). The grounds of decision do not, however, make it clear 
as to whether the learned district judge accepted that that right had been 
exercised by the plaintiff. This, perhaps, stemmed from the way the plaintiff ’s 
case had been pleaded in his Statement of Claim:  
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8. The Defendants have wrongfully repudiated the Cleaning 
Agreement and/or the Plaintiff ’s right to renew the Cleaning Agreement.  
10.46 The plaintiff ’s case was that “the defendants had repudiated their 
agreement by renouncing their liabilities under it” (at [42]). Citing (at [44]) 
the summary of the law on repudiation of contract in the form of a 
renunciation of the contract at para 24-018 of the 29th edition of Chitty on 
Contracts with approval, the learned district judge observed (at [45]) that 
“the operative test in determining whether there is such an intention not to 
go on with the contract is ‘whether the party renunciating [sic] has acted in 
such a way as to lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that he does not 
intend to fulfil his part of the contract …’ ” (paraphrasing the words of 
Devlin J in the case of Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation v Citati [1957] 
2 All ER 70); it entailed more than just a “ ‘mere refusal or omission of one of 
the contracting parties to do something which he ought to do’ under the 
contract” (following Freeth v Burr [1879] LR 9 CP 208), and required there to 
be an unwillingness or inability to perform some essential aspect of the 
contract. This, the learned judge opined, was a question of fact, for which the 
burden of proof lay on the plaintiff, being the party making the plea. In the 
opinion of the learned district judge, the plaintiff had failed to discharge this 
burden (at [46]). 
10.47 A number of comments may be made in response to the findings 
made by the learned district judge above. First, the basis for holding that the 
question whether a particular course of action by a contracting party 
amounts to renunciation of the entire contract so as to entitle the other party 
to discharge the contract (if he should so elect) for repudiatory breach is a 
question of fact is debateable. Certainly, the process of establishing what 
occurred involves questions of fact. But surely the process of establishing the 
legal implications of those factual occurrences does not.  
10.48 Second, the analysis at [46] makes it plain that in the court’s view, 
the defendant’s letters in February 2004 did not amount to renunciations of 
the contract, “the contract” being the original cleaning contract due to 
terminate on 15 March 2004. That seemingly being the case before the court, 
its reluctance to find that the defendant’s conduct had caused the plaintiff to 
lose the entire benefit of the contract is understandable. Much of “the 
contract” had already been performed, and it would soon come to an end 
anyway. The significance of this is highlighted by the court’s counter-example 
(towards the end of [46]) as to how differently it would have characterised 
the defendant’s actions had they occurred near the commencement of the 
contract. Given the wording of the term permitting extension of the contract 
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at the option of the plaintiff, and given the court’s findings that the 
preconditions for such exercise were satisfied, it is unfortunate that parties do 
not appear to have given the court the opportunity to consider whether the 
option had in fact been exercised by dint of the plaintiff ’s 28 November 2003 
letter so as to extend the cleaning contract beyond its original termination 
date of 15 March 2004 until 15 March 2006. Had that been the case put 
before the court, a nice question would have presented itself as to whether 
the defendant’s demand for return of the keys and appointment of another 
cleaning contractor at what would effectively have been the mid-point of the 
contract might constitute a renunciation of the defendant’s obligations so as 
to deprive the plaintiff of the whole of the benefit of the contact as extended. 
Acceptance of discharge by breach (whether actual or anticipatory) 
10.49 In the case of HG Metal Manufacturing Ltd v Nam Tat Hardware Co 
[2006] SGHC 37, Woo Bih Li J had occasion to reiterate the trite rule that a 
contract is only discharged by one party’s repudiatory breach on the other’s 
acceptance of that breach. In this case, the plaintiff (“HG Metal”) contracted 
on 6 September 2004 to purchase a quantity of mild steel from the defendant 
partnership (“Nam Tat”). Payment was to be made by way of letters of credit, 
one to be issued within seven days and the second within 14 days from the 
date of the contract. Under the terms of the contract, the plaintiff would take 
delivery of the steel in two batches upon receipt of the two letters of credit. 
Woo J’s judgment does not make it more precisely clear, but it appears that 
“soon” afterwards, the plaintiff made it known to the defendant that it would 
not be able to issue the letters of credit as it was contractually obliged to. 
From the judgment, it seems to have been assumed that this amounted to an 
anticipatory repudiatory breach. 
10.50 Certainly, if this was the case, it would have no effect vis-à-vis 
releasing the defendant from its own contractual obligations to remain ready, 
willing and able to deliver the quantities of steel, unless it could be found that 
Nam Tat had (1) accepted such repudiatory breach; and (2) communicated 
such acceptance to HG Metal. On these matters, Woo J found the defendant’s 
case to be lacking.  
10.51 The defendant’s evidence was that in response to the 
communication from the plaintiffs that it would not be issuing any letters of 
credit, one of the defendant’s partners had told a director of the plaintiffs 
that this rendered the contract “useless”. Woo J found that this did not 
amount to an unequivocal statement of intent to treat the contract as being 
at an end. In this, Woo J was fortified by the defendant firm’s actions in 
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allowing the plaintiffs to take part delivery of the steel even though no letter 
of credit had been received. The contract was thus still on foot. 
10.52 As a useful counter-example, one might look to the conduct of the 
plaintiffs in the case of Highness Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v Sigma Cable 
Co (Pte) Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 640. In this case, the plaintiff (“Highness 
Electrical”) contracted to purchase electrical cables from the defendant 
(“Sigma”) based on a schedule of agreed prices (fixed until the end of 2005). 
In 2004, the defendant held back deliveries of cables ordered by the plaintiff 
under the contract due to increases in the cost of raw materials used to 
fabricate those cables. Deliveries only resumed after the plaintiff agreed to an 
increase in the price to be paid. Even so, by early 2005, the defendant was still 
in arrears of delivery of cables ordered months earlier, and in February 2005, 
the defendant informed the plaintiff that it would be unilaterally treating the 
contract as being at an end as at April 2005. This last act was, plainly, an 
anticipatory repudiatory breach on the part of the defendant, and was 
accepted by the plaintiff as such: in contrast with the plaintiff in HG Metal 
(above), solicitors for the plaintiff in Highness Electrical stated plainly in their 
reply to the defendant that the plaintiff had accepted the defendant’s 
anticipatory breach and was treating the contract as being at an end. Having 
both demonstrated the plaintiff ’s intent and communicated the same to the 
defendant, the contract had plainly been terminated.  
10.53 More complicated are cases where the communication of acceptance 
of repudiation (due to non-payment of sums of money due under the 
contract) is followed by payment of those sums which are then accepted 
“without prejudice” to the payee’s prior rights. This issue was revisited in the 
case of Leivest International Pte Ltd v Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd [2006] 
1 SLR 888. In this case, a settlement agreement had been entered into 
between the landlord of certain premises and the tenant of those premises. 
Pursuant to this settlement agreement, a one-year lease for the premises was 
executed, with an option to renew. Unfortunately, the tenant was late in 
paying certain sums specified under the settlement agreement, leading the 
landlord to seek a declaration that this late payment amounted to a 
repudiation of the lease. 
10.54 Kan Ting Chiu J held that the tenant’s tardiness in making payment 
did amount to a repudiatory breach. The tenant’s non-payment as at the due 
date was met by a letter from the solicitors for the landlord, demanding that 
the tenant deliver up possession of the premises. Had matters stopped there, 
Kan J agreed that there would clearly have been acceptance of the tenant’s 
repudiatory breach of the settlement agreement. But matters did not so stop. 
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When payment was tendered two days later to the solicitors for the landlord, 
that payment was accepted, albeit, “without prejudice to our clients” 
(at [31]). Further, rent under the one-year lease continued to be demanded, 
paid and accepted (also, “strictly without prejudice to all our rights at law”: 
at [37]).  
10.55 Following Davenport v The Queen (1877) 3 App Cas 115, Kan J held 
that by its acceptance of the costs and its demand for and acceptance of the 
rent for the premises following the initial late payment, the landlord had 
waived the breaches and it could not, therefore, resurrect them: at [43]. It 
mattered not that these acceptances had been made “without prejudice”: 
at [38] and [41].  
Vitiating factors 
Misrepresentation 
10.56 The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation was considered at length in 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG v Archer Daniels Midland Co [2007] 
1 SLR 196. Certain structured trade finance transactions were entered into 
between the plaintiff bank and, inter alia, the defendant. The purpose of the 
transactions was to utilise the defendant’s trade flows to raise cheaper 
financing. In brief, the transactions involved the defendant selling certain 
goods to a company within the Parmalat group on a deferred 360-day 
payment term. The promissory note, issued in favour of the defendant for 
the goods and the payment of which was guaranteed by Parmalat, was 
discounted by the bank. The promisor and Parmalat defaulted in payment on 
account of the latter’s bankruptcy. In the action against the defendant, the 
bank alleged that the defendant had falsely represented that the sale 
transactions were genuine when in fact the defendant had no goods to sell at 
the relevant time which would have justified the issue of the promissory 
note. Andrew Ang J found that, although the representations were 
undoubtedly false, the false representations had not been made fraudulently 
as the defendant honestly believed that title to the goods would pass from the 
defendant to the buyer and that, in any event, issues of title were irrelevant to 
the plaintiff. 
10.57 Ang J stated (at [40] and [42]) as follows: 
Dishonesty is the touchstone which distinguishes fraudulent 
misrepresentation from other forms of misrepresentation. This turns on the 
intention and belief of the representor. A party complaining of having been 
misled by a representation to his injury has no remedy in damages under 
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the general law unless the representation was not only false, but 
fraudulent … Belief, not knowledge, is the test. 
10.58 On inducement, his Honour opined (at [53] and [54]) that there 
were two aspects to the element of inducement: 
First, it is relevant to consider the state of mind of the representor as the 
plaintiff must establish an intent to induce. The representor is presumed to 
have so intended once materiality is proved. The evidential burden then 
shifts to the representee to displace the prima facie case … Second, it is 
relevant … to consider the representee’s state of mind to see whether he 
altered his position as a result of receiving the representation. It is necessary 
to show actual inducement. 
It is important to note that an intention to induce (as opposed to knowledge 
of the falsity of the statement) appears crucial for a finding of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Mere knowledge that a statement made was false appears 
insufficient (see eg Tackey v McBain [1912] AC 186 and Rex Goose v Wilson 
Sandford & Co [2001] Lloyd’s Reports PN 189).  
10.59 It may also be inferred from Ang J’s judgment that materiality of the 
falsehood was not a separate requirement for establishing fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Although Ang J distinguished materiality from 
inducement, his Honour recognised their close relationship, opining that the 
latter may be inferred from the former. The position may, however, be 
different in the case of innocent misrepresentation (see Pan Atlantic Insurance 
Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501).  
Mistake 
10.60 In Wellmix Organics (International) Pte Ltd v Lau Yu Man [2006] 
2 SLR 117 (“Wellmix Organics”) (the facts of which were briefly stated in 
para 10.1 above on “Formation”), Andrew Phang Boon Leong J (as he then 
was) held that even if the parties had agreed to a consent unless order, such 
an agreement would have been vitiated by either mutual or unilateral 
mistake on the part of the defendant. The learned judge also took the 
opportunity to comment on various aspects of the doctrine of mistake. In 
respect of mutual mistakes, the learned judge observed (at [58]) that this 
category of mistakes completely overlaps with the doctrine of contract 
formation: 
Put simply, this particular aspect of the law relating to mistake is simply the 
result of a lack of coincidence between offer and acceptance. In other words, 
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both parties are at cross-purposes and, hence, no agreement or contract has 
been formed as a result. [emphasis in original] 
10.61 Of greater significance are Phang J’s observations on the doctrine of 
unilateral mistakes, the ambit and rationale of which were recently clarified 
by the Court of Appeal in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd 
[2005] 1 SLR 502 (“Digilandmall”). To briefly recall, the Court of Appeal 
held in Digilandmall that a unilateral mistake renders a contract void at 
common law only if the mistake was of a fundamental nature, and the non-
mistaken party has actual knowledge of the other’s error. Where actual 
knowledge has not been established, the contract may still be set aside in 
equity, but only if the non-mistaken party’s conduct can be said to involve an 
element of impropriety. Proof that the non-mistaken party has had 
constructive knowledge of the error would not suffice for this purpose. In 
Wellmix Organics, Phang J commented on the practical difficulty of 
distinguishing between actual and constructive knowledge, particularly in 
view of the fact that subjective (actual) knowledge is often ascertained by 
reference to objective evidence. Indeed, he observes (at [66]) that “what 
constitutes actual knowledge might well be a high … level of constructive 
knowledge ... [and] the paradigm model of this would arise in the situation 
of ‘Nelsonian knowledge’” (see also PW Lee, “Unilateral Mistake in Law and 
Equity – Solle v Butcher Reinstated” (2006) 22 JCL 81 at p 85). The learned 
judge is therefore of the view (at [68]) that the two types of knowledge are 
distinguished only by degree rather than kind. However, the practical 
difficulty arising from this fine conceptual distinction ought to be 
understood in its proper perspective:  
What is important and practical, … is that regardless of whether actual or 
constructive knowledge is found by the court in the case concerned, the 
requirement of knowledge is satisfied and justice is thereby achieved, 
assuming that the other necessary elements relating to the doctrine of 
unilateral mistake have been satisfied. (at [68]) 
10.62 More controversially, Phang J also proffered suggestions on 
rationalising the doctrines of unilateral mistake in law and equity. The 
learned judge contended (at [69]–[72]) that the two doctrines should in fact 
share a common formulation, differing only in their consequences. This may, 
in his view, have the practical effect of preferring the jurisdiction in equity, 
the application of which only renders a contract voidable (and not void) and 
which in turn avoids any adverse impact on the rights of innocent third 
parties. Although it is not explicit, the rationale underlying this proposed 
fused doctrine appears to be that of unconscionability and, indeed, Phang J 
would regard it to be a specific application of a broader doctrine of 
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unconscionability (see [71]–[72]; see also Andrew Phang, “Contract 
Formation and Mistake in Cyberspace – The Singapore Experience” (2005) 
17 SAcLJ 361 at pp 390–395). Phang J was, of course, mindful of the fact that 
this proposal ran counter to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Digilandmall. 
Hence, until and unless a change is effected by the appellate court or by 
legislation, the bifurcated jurisdiction affirmed in Digilandmall remains good 
law.  
10.63 In Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance (Singapore) Ltd v Metico Marine 
Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 333 (see supra para 10.14 on “The Terms of the 
Contract”), the High Court affirmed the established rule that a contract may 
only be rectified for common mistake where the contract erroneously fails to 
record the true intention of both contracting parties. In this case, the 
defendant failed to prove that a warranty was mistakenly included in a 
marine insurance policy and it followed that its plea of rectification had to be 
rejected.  
Undue influence 
10.64 In Lal Hiranand v Kamla Lal Hiranand [2006] SGHC 98, the High 
Court affirmed that the inquiry as to whether a contract had been procured 
by undue influence was essentially a factual one. The fact that the plaintiff, 
who was an established businessman with multiple interests in many parts of 
the world, had ready access to independent legal advice weighed heavily with 
the High Court. Although the decision has since been reversed on other 
grounds (see [2007] 2 SLR 165), on the issue of undue influence, Tay Yong 
Kwang J concluded that the “evidence adduced did not show, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the plaintiff was unable to exercise his free and informed 
judgment” (at [111]). Tay J also appeared to endorse (at [101]) the House of 
Lords decision in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge [2002] 2 AC 773.  
Illegality 
Restraint of Trade 
10.65 In what may come to be seen as a textbook illustration as to how the 
issue of restraint of trade clauses ought to be dealt with, District Judge Mavis 
Chionh handed down a clear and thorough exposition of the salient legal 
issues in the case of Collins & Aikman Floorcoverings Asia Pte Ltd v Low Su 
Peng Jeremy [2006] SGDC 154 (“Collins & Aikman”). The legal issues to be 
considered in this connection were as follows:  
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(a) All covenants in restraint of trade were prima facie void and 
unenforceable unless – and this was the only justification – the 
restriction was shown to be reasonable, both by reference to the 
interests of the parties and the interests of the public: at [107].  
(b) Such covenants would be viewed much more strictly when 
imposed on a servant in a contract of service, than when imposed in 
a contract for the sale of a business, primarily because the 
bargaining position of a servant in the former case was usually 
anything but equal to that of the prospective employer: at [108].  
(c) In consequence, a covenant which restrained a servant from 
competing with the master should the master-servant relationship 
come to an end was always void as being unreasonable, unless there 
was some exceptional proprietary interest owned by the master that 
required protection: at [109].  
(d) Proprietary interest took the form of either the employer’s 
trade secrets or his trade connections: at [111].  
(e) Proof of the existence of such proprietary interest was a 
question of fact depending on the evidence adduced in each case: at 
[114]. 
(f) The onus of proving such special circumstances as to justify 
a restraint fell upon the promisee (for example, by adducing 
evidence to show what was customary in the particular trade, what 
was usual among businessmen as to the terms of employment, and 
what particular dangers required precautions): at [110].  
10.66 None of the above is contentious, but the judgment serves as a 
pertinent reminder that restraint of trade clauses are not to be given overly 
broad effect. Therefore, even though the courts do not appear to take a 
technical view as to what constitutes “property” or “proprietary interests” of 
the employer in this context (see, eg, HRnet One Pte Ltd v Choo Wai Ying 
Adrian [2006] SGDC 202, where District Judge Laura Lau took the view that 
the test was whether there was “any trade secret or identifiable asset inherent 
in the business of the [employer] which could fairly be regarded as the 
[employer’s] property” [emphasis added]: at [49]), that does not absolve the 
need for the employer to prove the existence of such interest.  
10.67 Thus, assertions by an employer that it has trade secrets meriting 
enforcement of a restraint of trade clause against an ex-employee must be 
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proved in order to overturn the starting presumption against the validity of 
such clauses, and, as the grounds of decision of the learned district judge in 
Collins & Aikman show, such proof may be found in the safeguards placed by 
the employer to protect such trade secrets, as well as the degree to which such 
information (or parts thereof) were freely available: see [116]–[139].  
10.68 In relation to the alternative head of “proprietary interest”, viz, the 
employer’s business connections, Collins & Aikman also usefully highlights 
the point that what is critical is not merely the existence of business 
connections. Proof of the pertinent proprietary interest requires something 
more than evidence of the mere entry into business relations or the creation 
of running accounts with counter-parties on the basis of a public tender or 
publicly available information: see [144] and [145]. Having proven such 
connections, it has also to be shown that the ex-employee had been able to 
establish goodwill and influence over the counter-parties to such accounts (at 
[143]) during the term of his employment; goodwill and influence over 
counter-parties predating such employment would be ignored for these 
purposes (at [146]).  
Moneylending transactions 
10.69 Given the draconian effect which a finding of illegal moneylending 
has on the validity of contracts, a restrictive approach to its application is to 
be expected. This was made evident in what may become the locus classicus 
on the issue of what constitutes an unlicensed (and thus illegal) 
moneylending business, City Hardware Pte Ltd v Kenrich Electronics Pte Ltd 
[2005] 1 SLR 733 (discussed at (2005) 6 SAL Annual Review 160 at 
para 9.81). But what constitutes moneylending? This was the primary issue 
before Kan Ting Chiu J in the case of Pankaj s/o Dhirajlal v Donald McArthy 
Trading Pte Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 79 (“Pankaj”). 
10.70 In Pankaj, the plaintiff arranged for his bankers to issue letters of 
credit (“L/Cs”) in payment of goods purchased by the defendant. In return, 
the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff the principal sum of the L/Cs, a 
commission charge, and interest. The defendant having become indebted to 
the plaintiff pursuant to this agreement, proceedings were brought by the 
plaintiff when the debts were not repaid. In its defence, the defendant 
pleaded that the agreement was unenforceable as having contravened the 
Moneylenders Act (Cap 188, 1985 Rev Ed). 
10.71 Kan J made short work of rejecting this defence. Although 
moneylending transactions in violation of the Act may go beyond the loan or 
payment of money from the “lender” to the “borrower”, or some third party 
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on the directions of the “borrower” (at [17], adopting the analysis of Rajah J 
in City Hardware), not all forms of financial assistance involved the lending 
of money in breach of the Act (at [18]). Agreeing with the analysis of Lim 
Teong Qwee JC in Nissho Iwai International (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kohinoor 
Impex Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR 268 (at [18]), Kan J held that arrangements such 
as those before him in Pankaj were well known to those concerned with the 
import and export trade and were not loans in nature or in form. Although 
extension of such L/Cs amounted to a form of financial assistance, usually 
for profit, “unless we take all forms of financial assistance for a profit as 
moneylending, the arrangement between the plaintiff and the first defendant 
is not moneylending because no money is lent”: at [23]. 
Remedies 
Remedies under the contract and remedies for breach of contract  
10.72 Given the sophistication of construction contracts and, very often, 
the parties thereto, it is commonplace for obligors in breach of their 
obligations under such contracts to find that they may be subject to claims 
pursuant to the terms of the contract as well as claims for breach of the terms 
of the contract. Plainly, the principles relating to remoteness of damages are 
pertinent to the latter, but ought, in principle, have no bearing on the former. 
Confusion arises in these cases where the contractual claims pursuant to the 
contract are pre-conditioned on events which also amount to a contractual 
breach. One unfortunate example of this phenomenon appears to have 
cropped up in the case of Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd v RDC Concrete Pte Ltd 
[2006] SGHC 213. 
10.73 In this case, the plaintiff (“Sato Kogyo”) contracted to purchase 
concrete from the defendant (“RDC”). The contract provided that the 
plaintiff would purchase approximately 70,000m3 of concrete at specified 
prices between 1 September 2003 to 30 June 2006. On 5 April 2005, the 
defendant suspended supply of concrete, alleging non-payment. On 30 May 
2005, the plaintiff terminated the contract because the defendant’s concrete 
failed quality control requirements and because of delays in the supply of the 
concrete. 
10.74 To begin with, Lai Siu Chiu J held that the contract of supply was 
non-exclusive, meaning that the plaintiff was free to purchase concrete from 
other suppliers; and that the defendant did not have to supply concrete to the 
plaintiff in preference to other customers: the defendant would not be in 
breach of its obligation to supply concrete so long as it supplied up to 
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70,000m3 of concrete within the whole of the contract period (at [26]). The 
defendant’s practice of supplying concrete on a first-come-first-served basis 
did not amount to a breach of the contract as there was no express or 
implied term giving the plaintiff priority of supply.  
10.75 The next question was whether the plaintiff could recover from the 
defendant sums paid to such other suppliers in excess of the price specified in 
the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. In the learned judge’s 
opinion, this turned on the construction of two terms within the contract. 
The first, set out in Appendix 1A to the defendant’s revised quotation to the 
plaintiff headed “Terms and conditions of supply”, read as follows: 
D. All cube strength results must be made known to The Supplier [the 
defendant] within 7 days after the 28 days test result. Should there be cube 
failure, The Purchaser [the plaintiff] is to inform The Supplier in writing 
within 14 days, otherwise The Supplier shall not be held responsible for any 
such failure Should the concrete supplied fail to meet all compliance tests, 
The Supplier undertakes to supply to The Purchaser, free of charge, the 
volume of concrete judged defective. The Supplier shall not be liable for any 
claims whatsoever for consequential and/or other damages. 
The second was found in the plaintiff ’s letter of intent, and stated at cl 3: 
Notwithstanding the Terms and Conditions of Supply in your quotation, 
you [the defendant] are fully aware and will comply with the LTA’s latest 
revision of Materials and Workmanship Specification for Civil and 
Structural Works at no extra cost. 
And further, at cl 8: 
In the event that your supply is unable to meet LTA’s requirements, or you 
are unable to continue your supply, Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd reserves the 
right to terminate your contract and retain and use both the retention sum 
and any outstanding payment due to you and seek for alternative source of 
supply. In addition, Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd also reserves the right to seek 
from you any direct cost incurred due to your non-compliance.  
10.76 Having found that on its proper construction, the right to seek an 
indemnity from the defendant for “direct costs incurred” under cl 8 could 
only be invoked if the pre-condition of termination of the contract under 
that clause had been satisfied, and since the plaintiff did not terminate the 
contract until 30 May 2005, the learned judge held that the plaintiff was 
precluded from claiming the cost differential of alternative suppliers prior to 
that date: at [46]. 
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10.77 But it seems arguable, at least, that the remedies referred to in cl D to 
Appendix 1A and in cl 8 of the plaintiff ’s letter of intent were distinct from 
each other: cl D being aimed at modifying the defendant’s secondary 
obligations on failure to perform its primary obligation to supply concrete of 
satisfactory quality, exempting it from any liability for, “consequential and/or 
other damages”, whereas cl 8 provided for a contractual right of termination, 
a contractual right of set-off, and a contractual right of indemnification for 
“direct costs” incurred due to non-compliance with the contract. Thus, it 
might be said that one clause related to claims for common law damages for 
breach of contract, whereas the other related to claims pursuant to the 
contract. 
10.78 It is not clear from the grounds of decision if the distinction was 
drawn to the attention of the learned trial judge. However, it may be that the 
issues may have been conflated in two contexts. First, the learned judge 
appears to have been concerned with the question whether the exemption 
provisions in cl A operated to preclude recovery under the indemnity 
provision in cl 8: see [51]. Secondly, and seemingly without providing any 
clear answer to the afore-mentioned, the learned judge seems to have 
proceeded (at [52]–[55]) to dismiss any recovery of the “price differential” 
following 30 May 2005 on the basis that such price differential was not a 
“direct loss” as a result of breach, but was a “non-natural” head of damage 
within the second limb of the test in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 
of which no evidence as to the defendant’s actual knowledge thereof had 
been led: at [56]. This section of the learned judge’s grounds of decision 
appears to conflate the issues of recovery of damages with the question as to 
whether the contractual indemnity under cl 8 included the post-May 2005 
“price differentials” paid out by the plaintiff. Although the question of 
remoteness is entirely appropriate in the former context, its application in 
the latter is obscure. But perhaps this is to read too much into the judgment.  
10.79 Perhaps all that the learned judge sought to do was to deal with 
these two claims in the alternative. That is certainly one possible reading of 
the judgment, given the learned judge’s finding within the span of just one 
sentence, towards the end of [52], that “it would be straining the language to 
say the price differential ... would come under the meaning of ‘direct cost’”. 
That would, of course, require us to ignore the learned judge’s reference to 
Saint Line Limited v Richardsons, Westgarth & Co Limited [1940] 2 KB 99 
(“Saint Line”) as being in support of her construction of the clause, given 
that Saint Line was concerned with what constituted “direct damage” 
resulting from breach of contract, so as to fall within the ambit of a clause 
exempting liability for indirect or consequential losses in that case.  
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Damages where both parties to a contract are in breach and the defence of 
contributory negligence 
10.80 The case of Jet Holding Ltd v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
[2006] 3 SLR 769 has already been discussed in the context of terms implied 
by law (see paras 10.28–10.32 above). As discussed above, this case held that 
the sub-contract for refurbishment of a slip-joint between the first and 
second defendants, namely, Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
(“Cameron”) and Stork Technology Services Asia Pte Ltd (“Stork”), 
contained a term implied in law that Cameron would exercise reasonable 
care in the determination of the scope of work to be carried out by Stork on 
the slip-joint. As Cameron had failed to provide Stork with the pertinent 
dimensional drawings of the slip-join, Cameron was in breach of this 
implied term. The complication arose because Stork was itself in breach of its 
obligation under the contract to detect any deficiencies in the riser box to 
which the slip-joint was attached (a deficiency which directly led to the 
eventual failure of the refurbished slip-joint).  
10.81 The Court of Appeal recognised that although Cameron was itself in 
breach of duty of care in the tort of negligence to the first and second 
plaintiffs, and would be liable in damages for their losses, given Stork’s 
breach of its contractual obligations to Cameron as mentioned above, Stork 
was obliged to indemnify Cameron for such damages. However, given that 
Cameron was itself also in breach of its contractual obligations to Stork, 
Cameron was also obliged to indemnify Stork.  
10.82 The Court of Appeal observed that there were two analytical 
approaches to break the circle of indemnification. The first would be to 
determine whether one obligation was precedent to the other (ie whether 
Cameron’s implied obligation to take reasonable care was a condition 
precedent to Stork’s express obligation under the contract); if this was so, 
unless breach of the precedent condition had been waived, Cameron would 
not be entitled to look to Stork for indemnification. This, though, was 
inapplicable on the facts: the court was not convinced that Cameron’s 
obligation could, as a matter of construction, be taken to be a condition 
precedent to the performance of Stork’s obligations. Even if, hypothetically, 
that had been the case, Stork’s commencement of performance of its 
obligations would seem to amount to a waiver of Cameron’s implied 
obligation to take reasonable care, and might even amount to a waiver of any 
breach of such condition (see [96]).  
10.83 So Cameron’s implied obligation was found by the court not to be a 
condition precedent to Stork’s express obligations. Consequently, it was not 
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barred from seeking an indemnity from Stork for breaching its express 
obligations to conduct a dimensional inspection of the riser box with 
reasonable care. It was important to note, however, that Stork’s own 
obligation was not an absolute one – it was, in fact, coincident with its duty 
of care in tort (see [100]). As such, the defence of contributory negligence as 
provided for by the Negligence and Personal Injuries Act (Cap 54, 2002 Ed), 
the principles of application of which were authoritatively set out by the 
Court of Appeal in Fong Maun Yee v Yoong Weng Ho Robert [1997] 2 SLR 
297), would seem to be entirely apposite, this being a case where Stork’s 
liability to Cameron in contract was concurrent with its liability to Cameron 
in tort. On the facts before it, the court was satisfied that Cameron’s own 
negligence had contributed to 50% of the losses caused by Stork’s breach. 
What this meant, in light of the finding in the court below that Stork and 
Cameron were equally liable to the first and second plaintiffs in the sum of 
US$1m, was that: (a) Cameron and Stork were each liable to pay to the first 
and second plaintiffs the sum of US$500,000; (b) given Stork’s breach of its 
express contractual obligations in relation to Cameron, Cameron was 
entitled to be fully indemnified for that sum by Stork; (c) but since Stork 
could rely on the Negligence and Personal Injuries Act to seek 
apportionment of the loss given Cameron’s own contributory negligence 
(which was also assessed at 50%), this meant that Cameron could only seek 
an “indemnity” or rather, a “contribution” from Stork in the sum of 
US$250,000 (at [120]–[122]). In effect, Stork would bear the responsibility 
for paying US$750,000 out of the US$1m awarded to the first and second 
plaintiffs. 
10.84 The court recognised, however, that where there was no such 
concurrent liability, direct application of the statute would not be possible. 
Nevertheless, in obiter dicta, the court acknowledged that similar effects 
might be fruitfully arrived at in the appropriate case through the application 
of a variety of other approaches (as have already surfaced in various parts of 
the Commonwealth). For example: “anticipatory mitigation” (at [105]); 
treating losses for which the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as being 
“too remote” (at [106]); implying a further term in fact that the parties 
would exercise due care for his or her interest (at [107]); or a denial of 
causation for the loss (at [108]) – any of these might usefully assist in the 
development of this corner of Singapore common law. In the court’s view, all 
of these approaches, just like the question of apportionment under the 
Negligence and Personal Injuries Act, stemmed from the rationale of fairness 
(at [109]).  
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10.85 A note of caution, however, was raised in relation to the relevance of 
any doctrine derived from the “reasonable expectations of honest men” as set 
out by the Court of Appeal in Tribune Investment Trust Inc v Soosan Trading 
Co Ltd [2000] 3 SLR 405 to the development of this area of the common law. 
While recognising that the concept was an important one, the Court clarified 
that it had not, as yet, “attained the status of a substantive legal doctrine in 
and of itself ” (at [111]) and indicated that further development of this part 
of the common law would likely have to be by reference to the other “devices” 
as identified in earlier parts of its judgment. 
Damages for expenses incurred prior to breach 
10.86 In the case of Van Der Horst Engineering Pte Ltd v Rotol Singapore 
Ltd [2006] 2 SLR 586, Andrew Ang J had occasion to apply the ruling in 
Anglia Television Ltd v Reed [1972] 1 QB 60 (“Anglia Television”) permitting 
damages to be assessed on the basis of expenses incurred but which would 
have been recouped out of the revenues to be generated had the promisor 
not breached the contract, whether such expenses accrued before or after the 
contract. In this case, the plaintiff, Van Der Horst Engineering Pte Ltd 
(“VDH”) entered into a subscription and options agreement (the “SOA”) 
with the defendant, Rotol Singapore Ltd (“Rotol”). Under the SOA, VDH 
agreed to subscribe for 110m new shares in Rotol at 11.5¢ per share. The 
SOA also granted VDH a call option for another 110m new shares at the 
same subscription price of 11.5¢. On the execution of the SOA and pursuant 
to its terms, VDH paid a sum of $100,000 to Rotol as earnest money. But 
following from this, VDH discovered that Rotol had breached certain terms 
under the SOA. Ultimately, these led VDH to terminate the SOA, and to 
commence legal proceedings to obtain a refund of the earnest money, as well 
as special and general damages. 
10.87 Leaving aside the issue of the refund of the earnest money, VDH 
claimed, as damages, its legal and professional fees in due diligence and in the 
negotiation and preparation of the SOA with Rotol. These were, of course, 
incurred prior to Rotol’s breach of the contract. Nevertheless, Ang J applied 
the principle set out in Anglia Television and permitted VDH to recover these 
pre-breach reliance expenditures, holding that it was within the 
contemplation of the parties that these pre-breach expenditures would be 
recouped from the benefit of Rotol’s performance of the contract – see [54].  
10.88 Ang J noted that a plaintiff could either recover for gains prevented 
by the breach of contract (ie on an “expectation loss” basis) or, if such gains 
could not easily be quantified or were unlikely, owing to the contract being 
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unprofitable, he could alternatively, claim expenses rendered futile by the 
breach (ie on a “reliance” basis) – at [54]. But this does not mean that 
plaintiffs should be allowed to get out of a bad bargain. The learned judge 
noted at [55]: 
[I]n entering into the SOA, VDH expected to derive a benefit from Rotol’s 
performance of the SOA. That such benefit is not easily reducible to a 
monetary figure should not preclude recoupment of the expenses incurred 
if the contract was not duly performed. To put it another way, it may 
reasonably be inferred that, to VDH, the benefit to be derived from Rotol’s 
performance of the SOA would have been worth at least the expenditure 
incurred by VDH. (To that, a qualification ought to be made; if the 
subscription for the shares under the SOA was a bad bargain, Rotol could 
not put itself in a better position than if the SOA had been duly performed. 
However, there was no suggestion by Rotol that such were the 
circumstances here). 
Damages for loss of a chance 
10.89 The issues discussed in the Court of Appeal case of Asia Hotel 
Investments Ltd v Starwood Asia Pacific Management Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 661 
(“Asia Hotel Investments”) (see (2004) 5 SAL Ann Rev 196 at paras 9.109–
9.127) were usefully applied and clarified by Tay Yong Kwang J in his grounds 
of decision in the case of Justlogin Pte Ltd v Oversea-Chinese Banking 
Corporation Ltd [2007] 1 SLR 425 (“Justlogin Pte Ltd”). On the thorny issue 
as to the standard of proof required for a successful claim for damages for 
breach of contract causing the loss of a chance of a particular favourable 
outcome, Tay J focussed at [34] on a particularly infelicitously worded 
section in the grounds of decision delivered by the majority in Asia Hotel 
Investments: 
135 Once causation is established for the loss of a chance, all that is 
needed to be shown is that the chance which was lost was real or substantial. 
It is not the loss of practically any chance which will give rise to a 
remedy … 
… 
137 However, what would constitute a real or substantial chance need 
not be proved on the balance of probabilities. …  
10.90 Taken out of context, [137] of Asia Hotel Investments could well be 
taken to mean that a standard of proof lower than the balance of probabilities 
is to be applied to determine the question as to whether a particular breach 
of contract has caused the loss of a real or substantial chance, a position 
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which was emphatically rejected by the seemingly dissentient grounds of 
decision handed down by Yong Pung How CJ in that case. However, read 
within the totality of the grounds handed down by Chao Hick Tin JA (as 
Tay J usefully sets out at [34] of his grounds of decision in Justlogin Pte Ltd), 
the majority’s position is plain: there is no reason in principle why a plaintiff 
may not successfully prove that it has lost a real or substantial chance of a 
favourable outcome when that real or substantial chance could only be rated 
at or below 50%. That percentage rating (even if lower than 50%) would 
simply be just another fact for which the standard of proof was the usual one, 
though proof of chances rated at a point so low as to be speculative would 
still be precluded. Thus, as Tay J points out (at [38]), in cases of loss of a 
chance, “[w]hat we are concerned with is the loss of a chance of a favourable 
outcome rather than the favourable outcome itself ”.  
10.91 At this juncture, it is helpful to note that the analysis would have 
been very different had the chance of the favourable outcome (being the 
acquisition of the assets of a company of which the defendants were the 
majority shareholder) been solely dependent on the plaintiff ’s own actions 
and decisions: they were not – the chance of a favourable outcome was 
dependent on the positions to be taken by the minority shareholders of the 
target company (as the learned judge recognised, at [40]). In cases where the 
chance of a favourable outcome is solely dependent on the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that it would have taken 
such steps as would bring about that very outcome. For a recent discussion of 
the distinction between these two types of claim, see J Poole, “Loss of chance 
and the evaluation of hypotheticals in contractual claims” [2007] LMCLQ 63.  
10.92 So, in relation to claims for loss of a chance of a favourable outcome 
dependent on third parties, there are two stages to the enquiry: first, 
establishing that the defendant’s breach has caused the plaintiff the loss of a 
chance (not a certainty) of a particular outcome; and second, establishing the 
value of that loss. As to the second stage of valuation, Tay J applied a robust 
approach, ascertaining firstly, the net monetary gain to the plaintiff had the 
defendant not breached its obligation under their contract on the assumption 
that such gains were an absolute certainty; and secondly, discounting that 
gain by reference to the percentage chance that the plaintiff might have 
successfully derived such gains: at [77] (consistent with the approach taken 
in Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786).  
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Mitigation 
10.93 The facts of the case of Highness Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd v 
Sigma Cable Co (Pte) Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 640 (“Highness Electrical”) have 
already been set out above (supra, para 10.52). Apart from being a useful 
illustration as to the importance of clearly communicating one’s acceptance 
of the other’s anticipatory repudiatory breach so as to terminate the contract, 
it is a timely reminder of the well-accepted rule that, although acceptance of 
an offer of performance from the party-in-breach might well amount to a 
reasonable mitigatory step, such acceptance is not expected in all cases. 
Rather, such acceptance will only be treated as a reasonable mitigatory step in 
instances where the innocent party still retains confidence in the ability of 
the party-in-breach to perform its part of the bargain. On the facts of 
Highness Electrical, given the repeated difficulties which the plaintiff had 
encountered with the defendant, no such confidence could be entertained. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff could not be said to have failed to mitigate its losses 
when it refused to accept the defendant’s offer to deliver electrical cables as 
per the terms of the original contract. 
Measure of damages for breach of contract for sale of goods 
10.94 The facts of the case of Panwah Steel Pte Ltd v Burwill Trading Pte 
Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 559 have already been discussed in the related case of 
Panwah Steel Pte Ltd v Koh Brothers Building & Civil Engineering Contractor 
(Pte) Ltd [2006] 4 SLR 571 (see discussion at paras 10.12–10.14 on 
“Construction of Terms”). Apart from providing guidance on that issue, in 
this case, the Court of Appeal also provided guidance on the application of 
s 51(3) of the Sale of Goods Act (Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed), which reads:  
Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of 
damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the 
contract price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or 
times when they ought to have been delivered or (if no time was fixed) at 
the time of the refusal to deliver. 
10.95 As the Court of Appeal noted, this provision turns on the meaning 
of what constitutes “an available market”. Usefully adding to the scarce 
commentary on the concept (culled from paras 16-059 and 16-062 of 
Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (A G Guest gen ed) (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th Ed, 
2002), the Court of Appeal noted (at [34]) that: 
[T]he relative dearth of guidance with respect to what constitutes “an 
available market” is perhaps due to the fact that this is very much a factual 
inquiry ... For example, much would turn on the nature of the product 
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concerned, the quantities involved, the available sources of supply, the 
timeframe involved as well as the prices and price movements – to take but 
a few of the more common factors. What this means, on a more general 
level, is that one has to be rather careful in citing past precedents – even 
where the same product is concerned. The citation of precedents for the 
purpose of drawing general principles for application to the facts at hand 
do not [sic], of course, pose any difficulties. Difficulties, however, will arise 
when one attempts to cite a prior precedent in order to persuade the court 
to adopt the precise figures therein – or even figures which are close to it. 
This is not to state that the court will never apply a precedent in such a 
specific fashion. However, the facts would need to be virtually on “all fours” 
with the facts in the case at hand. 
10.96 Given the factual nature of the inquiry as to what constitutes an 
available market for the purposes of quantifying Panwah’s losses as a result of 
Burwill’s short delivery on the two Burmese contracts, the Court of Appeal 
took the view that the Building and Construction Authority (“BCA”) and 
International Enterprise Singapore (“IE”) figures adduced by Panwah, being 
derived from the average of prices from many contracts, were more 
consistent with their derivation from a market, as compared with the 
approach taken by the trial judge, which had been to rely on the price of the 
Second Burmese Agreement. Therefore, although, the Court of Appeal 
accepted the trial judge’s reservations as to the applicability of the BCA prices 
(which were for exports), it took the view that the IE prices ought to be taken 
as the yardstick for this particular set of proceedings. Nevertheless, the Court 
of Appeal took pains to emphasise that this ought not to be taken as setting 
down any general rule that IE prices ought invariably to be taken as 
constituting “market prices” in the future (at [37]).  
Waiver of right to damages for breach of contract 
10.97 The High Court has recently adopted the position taken by the 
Hong Kong courts in relation to the burden of proof as to the issue of waiver 
of one’s right to damages for breach of contract. In TCL Industries (Malaysia) 
Sdn Bhd v ICC Chemical Corp [2006] SGHC 88, the learned judge noted (at 
[88])that:  
At law, as pointed out in the plaintiff ’s closing submissions (citing 
P&M Industrial Company Limited v Winner Bob (HK) Company Limited 
[2000] 233 HKCU 1), the defendant bears the burden of proving clear and 
unequivocal words or acts on the part of the plaintiff that it waived its right 
to damages or claims.  
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10.98 Though this is helpful as far as the question of burden of proof is 
concerned, because the trial judge was not satisfied that the defendant had 
discharged this burden, the doctrinal question that would necessarily follow 
as to the legal or equitable basis for such waiver having any effect did not 
require examination. For a discussion of these difficulties, see A Mandaraka-
Sheppard, “Demystifying the Right of Election in Contract Law” (2006) 
18 SAcLJ 60, as well as G H Treitel, The Law of Contract (Thomson Sweet & 
Maxwell, 11th Ed, 2003) at pp 102–124.  
10.99 Some of these difficulties were, however, acknowledged by Belinda 
Ang Saw Ean J in The Pacific Vigorous [2006] 3 SLR 374. Having noted that 
the abandonment of an accrued right to damages is not something to be 
facilely inferred (at [10]), Ang J went on to quote Dr Sheppard’s analysis 
(supra) with approval. : 
Dr Sheppard observed that once a right after breach has accrued, a release 
or discharge of that right is either by deed or upon consideration. She also 
noted that for a finding of an effectual total abandonment of rights one 
should be looking at whether or not the elements of equitable or 
promissory estoppel exist. As stated, the defendant did not raise estoppel 
and there was good reason for that. The defendant would not have been in a 
position to raise common law estoppel or a promissory estoppel. In both 
cases, there would have to be some sort of acting on the representation. The 
representee must have acted on the representation to his detriment. 
10.100 Although one cannot but agree with the observation that any 
abandonment of an accrued right of action can only be given effect at 
common law where consideration has been furnished or if a deed to that 
effect has been executed (see, eg A Phang, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law 
of Contract – Singapore and Malaysian Edition (Butterworths, 1994), at 
pp 802–805: the presence of consideration or a deed would, in effect, give rise 
to a discharge of the contract by agreement), the seeming conjunction 
between these common law mechanisms and the doctrine of estoppel 
(whether in its promissory or other forms) suggested by Ang J’s choice of 
words (“... also noted that for a finding of an effectual total abandonment of 
rights one should be looking at whether or not the elements of equitable or 
promissory estoppel exist ...”) is unfortunate. Rather, Dr Sheppard’s point 
seems to have been that the finding of the presence of equitable or 
promissory estoppel would be an alternative to consideration or a seal, her 
ultimate conclusion being that the unwieldy doctrine of “waiver” ought to be 
seen as comprising four different components:  
Reviewing the authorities, it has been revealed that there is no meaningful 
use of “waiver”. The instances in which it has been used can be limited to 
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cases where the contract remained unaltered by a mere concession, or there 
was a binding variation, or equitable estoppel, or election. [(2006) 18 SAcLJ 
60 at para 111] 
Election between inconsistent causes of action, rights and remedies  
10.101 What is of greatest interest in The Pacific Vigorous [2006] 3 SLR 374 
is the learned judge’s treatment of the very difficult area relating to election 
between inconsistent causes of action. As will be recalled, in this case, the 
respondent-plaintiff, Agritrade, had brought in rem proceedings against the 
appellant-defendant, Pacific Vigorous, for mis-delivery of goods. In breach of 
the contract of carriage entered into between Agritrade and Pacific Vigorous, 
the appellant delivered the cargo in question to Bhatia, even though the bills 
of lading for the cargo had not been presented – they were still in Agritrade’s 
possession. Agritrade therefore brought proceedings against Pacific Vigorous 
for breach of contract for mis-delivery and sought summary judgment. 
10.102 Resisting the application, counsel for Pacific Vigorous had argued 
before the assistant registrar that there were three triable issues giving rise to 
defences to Agritrade’s actions. The assistant registrar gave leave to defend, 
prompting Agritrade to bring the present appeal before Belinda Ang Saw 
Ean J. Ang J allowed the appeal and ordered that interlocutory judgment be 
entered for Agritrade, with damages to be assessed. In so doing, Ang J seems 
to have also considered what seems to have been a fresh submission by 
counsel for Pacific Vigorous (which the learned judge was entitled to do, 
since such appeals operate by way of re-hearing): that Agritrade’s actions 
subsequent to the mis-delivery precluded the bringing of such an action.  
10.103 Counsel’s argument ran thus: Bhatia had, in fact, contracted to 
purchase the cargo in question. Despite not being in possession of the 
relevant bills of lading for the cargo, by agreeing to indemnify the defendant, 
Bhatia managed to get delivery of the cargo. On delivery, Bhatia discovered 
that the cargo did not conform to their contract description (as per its 
contract of sale with Agritrade). Nevertheless, Bhatia chose not to reject the 
goods but elected to pay Agritrade in part, making a deduction to reflect its 
losses as a result of the non-conformity of the goods with the contract 
description. This part payment was accepted by Agritrade. This, counsel 
submitted, amounted to an election by Agritrade to treat the earlier defective 
performance by Pacific Vigorous as good delivery under the contract of 
carriage. Counsel submitted that Agritrade was therefore precluded from 
pursuing its mis-delivery claim against Pacific Vigorous for breach of 
contract. That “right” was alternative to and inconsistent with Agritrade’s 
“right” against Bhatia under the contract of sale: at [11].  
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10.104 After noting that care ought to be taken in reference to cases on 
election and the distinction that ought to be drawn between cases of election 
between rights and those involving election between remedies (at [13]), 
Ang J disposed of counsel’s submission as follows (at [18]): 
No election arose in the sense that the defendant was wrong in contending 
that Agritrade had two inconsistent rights. The case for the defendant did 
not involve the pursuit of two alternative and inconsistent rights argued for 
by [counsel for Pacific Vigorous]. The “inconsistent rights” as formulated by 
[counsel] were: 
(a) the right to treat the delivery of the cargo as wrongful 
and to pursue the defendant and Bhatia for conversion of the 
cargo; and 
(b) the right to treat the delivery of the cargo as lawful and 
to pursue Bhatia for the price of the cargo. 
The claims here fell under two contracts giving rise to separate and 
independent causes of action and they were against two different persons. 
The rule against double recovery imposed a limitation on a plaintiff like 
Agritrade’s ability in such a situation to recover in the aggregate from one 
or more defendants an amount in excess of its loss. The fact that there were 
no inconsistent rights was sufficient to dispose of the doctrine of common 
law election. 
10.105 That Ang J’s conclusion was correct cannot be disputed, although it 
appears that the distinct rule as to double recovery (which operates post-
judgment) may have been conflated with the rule as to election between 
inconsistent rights (which operates pre-judgment). The point which the 
learned judge sought to make was, perhaps, this: although there was no 
inconsistency between Agritrade’s rights vis-à-vis Pacific Vigorous (for mis-
delivery on the carriage contract) and Bhatia (for non-payment of the full 
price on the contract for sale of the goods comprising the cargo) and there 
was thus no need for Agritrade to elect between the two, at judgment, the 
principle against double recovery would operate to preclude a full award of 
damages on both contracts without taking into account any award on the 
other.  
10.106 Difficulties, however, are created by the learned judge’s observations 
(at [19]) that: 
Agritrade’s remedies as between Bhatia on the one hand and the defendant 
on the other are cumulative, not alternative, remedies so much so that 
Agritrade was not required to choose between remedies.  
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10.107 With respect, these observations, and the exposition that follows, 
would seem to add to the confusion between election between rights and 
remedies for which warning had been sounded in an earlier part of the 
judgment. Having accepted counsel’s submissions to be directed at the 
doctrine of election between inconsistent rights, the reversion to an analysis 
based on election between inconsistent remedies is inexplicable. If these 
observations were intended to found an alternative ground for the learned 
judge’s decision, that intention is certainly not made plain, nor were the 
reasons as to why or how counsel’s submissions might reasonably be viewed 
as going towards the question of inconsistent remedies set out.  
Equitable relief for breach of contract 
10.108 The case of Lee Chee Wei v Tan Hor Peow Victor [2006] SGHC 116 
(“Lee Chee Wei”) raises some interesting questions. The facts, as found by the 
trial judge, were these. In February 2005, the plaintiff entered into a contract 
with the fourth defendant, acting as agent for the first and third defendants, 
wherein the plaintiff ’s entire shareholding in a private limited company 
called Distributed Management Solutions Ltd (“DMS”) was to be sold to the 
first and third defendants for a sum of $4.5m. An advance payment of 
$750,000 was paid, with the balance to be paid, at the latest, on 30 April 2005 
(by which date it was expected that DMS would have been successfully listed 
on the Singapore Exchange). It appears to have been accepted that even 
though the contract was ratified by the first and third defendants in March 
2005, the balance of the $4.5m was not paid, even though the plaintiff was 
ready and willing to hand over the requisite share transfer documents (see 
[12]). The first and third defendants were thus plainly in breach of their 
obligations as purchasers under their contract with the plaintiff.  
10.109 The difficulties with the case begin with the remedies sought by the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff ’s prayers for relief are not set out in full in the 
judgment. But it seems the plaintiff primarily sought the remedy of specific 
performance or, alternatively, for damages in lieu of specific performance 
(see at [9]). Choo Han Teck J observed that even if one accepted that shares 
in a private limited company are unique or have intrinsic value as such, “that 
would only be a perspective from the point of view of the purchaser. The 
vendor’s interest in the contract of sale was strictly monetary. What he 
wanted was payment of the purchase price” (at [9]). It would thus not be 
appropriate to make an order of specific performance in favour of the vendor 
of such shares. The alternative prayer for damages was, in turn, dismissed on 
the procedural point that the plaintiff had not pleaded for such damages to 
be assessed, nor had the counsel for the plaintiff applied for the pleadings to 
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be amended until it was far too late. This was critical, because the plaintiff 
did not adduce any evidence at trial as to his losses: see [10] and [11].  
Refund of advance payments 
10.110 The above does not present much difficulty. What is seemingly more 
difficult, appears at [12] of the learned judge’s grounds of decision. This 
merits quoting in full:  
If neither specific performance nor an order for the assessment of damages 
was given, it followed that the plaintiff was obliged to return the $750,000. 
He would be entitled to retain the money only if the contract provided that 
it was paid as a non-refundable deposit or that the plaintiff had performed 
his part of the bargain. He might have been ready and willing to do so, but 
the fact was that he did not hand over the executed transfer forms to the 
defendants. On the longstop completion date (30 April 2005) he was to 
hand over the transfer documents duly executed but did not do so on 
account of the fourth defendant not appearing. I noted that cl 4.3 of the 
Contract provided that: “No Party shall be obliged to perform any of its 
obligations under cl 4.2 unless (simultaneously with such performance) the 
other Party performs all its obligations under that Clause.” This meant that 
the plaintiff was not obliged to execute the transfer documents and could 
not be said to be himself in breach on account of not performing his part, 
but it could not mean that he was entitled to keep any money already paid 
unless the Contract expressly or clearly indicated that that money was not 
required to be returned in the event of a breach.  
10.111 Care should be taken in reading this part of Choo J’s judgment. 
First, it is settled law that advance part-payments of the purchase price under 
a contract are, in principle, recoverable by the payer from the payee, even 
where the payer is in breach of contract by not making the balance payment: 
see Dies v British and Internal Mining and Financial Corp Ltd [1939] 1 KB 
724. However, if such advance payment has been deposited as earnest money 
which payer and payee intended to operate as a guarantee of due 
performance of the payer’s obligations, at common law, such earnest money 
need not be returned and is instead forfeited by the payee (subject to the 
payer being able to persuade the court to grant him equitable relief against 
forfeiture): see Howe v Smith (1884) 27 Ch D 89. Although Choo J noted that 
there was no express provision in the contract that such advance payments 
would be forfeited by the plaintiff (which would put the question beyond 
doubt), it remains a question of construction of the terms of the contract as 
to whether the term requiring the advance payment is to be construed as 
taking the former form rather than the latter.  
210 SAL Annual Review (2006) 
 
10.112 Choo J then suggests that had the plaintiff performed his part of the 
bargain by handing over to the purchaser defendants the share transfer 
forms, there would have been no need to return the $750,000. But it seems it 
would not have been sufficient for the plaintiff to be ready and willing to do 
so. The wording in the judgment that, “[the plaintiff] might have been ready 
and willing to do so, but the fact was that he did not hand over the executed 
transfer forms to the defendants …” suggests actual performance is required. 
With respect, this obscures the important role that the tendering of 
performance plays in contract law. In Startup v Macdonald (1843) 6 Man & G 
593, it was stated (at 610) that: 
In every contract by which a party binds himself to deliver goods or pay 
money to another, he in fact engages to do an act which he cannot 
completely perform without the concurrence of the party to whom the 
delivery or the payment is to be made. Without acceptance on the part of 
him who is to receive, the act of him who is to deliver or to pay can amount 
only to a tender. But the law considers a party who has entered into a 
contract to deliver goods or pay money to another as having, substantially, 
performed it if he has tendered the goods or the money ... provided only 
that the tender has been made under such circumstances that the party to 
whom it has been made has had a reasonable opportunity of examining the 
goods, or the money, tendered, in order to ascertain that the thing tendered 
really was what it purported to be. 
10.113 In light of the above, unless the effect of Lee Chee Wei is to repudiate 
the role of tender of performance in instances of sale of shares (as opposed to 
goods), Choo J’s analysis here requires some expansion: the flaw in the 
plaintiff ’s case lay not in the fact that he might have been ready and willing to 
execute and deliver the share transfer forms, nor the fact that he did not 
actually execute and deliver them. Rather, the critical point was that the 
plaintiff did not tender such performance. That is to say, the plaintiff does 
not seem to have attempted performance of his obligations under the 
contract (or, at least, the facts as set out in the judgment do not suggest that 
he did). The key concept is not that performance be “actual”. It is enough if 
performance be attempted, for actual performance of the obligation in this 
contract could not have been completed without the cooperation of the 
defendants. And this underpins the otherwise odd failure of plaintiff ’s 
counsel to bring an action for a fixed sum against the defendants (as noted 
above): without such tender or attempted performance, the balance of the 
purchase price was never due.  
